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GAINSHARING AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Nicole Martingano-Reinhart*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Gainsharing” is a business practice that can reduce costs and
increase efficiency while engaging and rewarding front-line workers,
those who work most directly with customers or with the product a
1
company manufactures. Although the practice reportedly began as
2
early as the nineteenth century, it became popular in the 1930s in
3
the steel manufacturing industry. While several different forms of
performance incentives fall under the category of gainsharing, in the
typical gainsharing arrangement employees suggest cost-saving
4
improvements to processes and the selection of materials. They
receive a previously agreed upon portion of the savings associated
5
with the improvements as compensation.
Hospitals and healthcare systems have attempted to introduce
gainsharing programs in healthcare settings in order to help reduce

* J.D. magna cum laude, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. magna cum
laude, 2005, New York University. The author would like to thank Professor Frank
Pasquale for his guidance throughout the comment writing process and Michael
Kalison, Esq. for his insights on the Medicare Physician-Hospital Collaboration
Demonstration and the practical aspects of gainsharing programs.
1
See V. Michel Magliore Marcoux, Why Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Laws Should
Allow Appropriate Hospital Gainsharing, 59 ALA. L. REV. 539, 542 (2008).
2
Theresa M. Welbourne & Luis R. Gomez Mejia, Gainsharing: A Critical Review
and a Future Research Agenda 3 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Working
Paper No. 95-10, 1995), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=cahrswp&sei-redir
=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26source%3Dwe
b%26cd%3D4%26sqi%3D2%26ved%3D0CDQQFjAD%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F
%252Fdigitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%
253D1199%2526context%253Dcahrswp%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dhistory%2520of%252
0gainsharing%26ei%3DNhqeTruSFsWw8QPEqNGKCQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNEykAM
n_1_ZyRYt84sMNN308_mTNw%26sig2%3D3jXbaBIq6Muypog1GOmv1A#search=%
22history%20gainsharing%22.
3
Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma
of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 148 (2003).
4
See Marcoux, supra note 1, at 542.
5
See id.
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the increasing costs of healthcare.
Unfortunately, gainsharing
programs are likely to violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute
(AKS), the Stark Law, and the Civil Monetary Penalties Statute (CMP
7
Statute). Gainsharing programs may also preclude hospitals from
8
tax-exempt status. Consequently, gainsharing has been limited to a
few Medicare demonstration programs, limited programs intended to
provide data on whether to permit gainsharing on a more widespread
basis. The statutes that provide for these demonstration programs
allow for waivers or exemptions of the AKS, Stark Law, and CMP
9
Statute for hospitals participating in the demonstration programs.
On March 23, 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) for the purpose of expanding
10
health insurance coverage and reducing the cost of healthcare.
Because gainsharing is one potential method of reducing costs while
maintaining or improving performance, this Comment will analyze
whether PPACA adequately removes the legal barriers associated with
gainsharing.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of gainsharing
practices and attempts to institute gainsharing in healthcare settings.
It also identifies potential risks for Congress to consider when
enacting statutory safe harbors or amending the applicable laws to
encourage the creation of gainsharing programs. Part III discusses
the statutory barriers to establishing gainsharing programs in
hospitals and pre-PPACA efforts to eliminate those barriers. Part IV
of this Comment discusses provisions in PPACA that may help resolve
the legal problems associated with gainsharing. It then analyzes the
likelihood that these provisions will encourage successful gainsharing
programs. Part IV also argues that the solutions adopted in PPACA

6

See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5007(c)(1), 120
Stat. 4 (2006); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
7
Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based
Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 442, 486–89 (2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b (2006) (the AKS); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (Stark); id. § 1320a-7a (the CMP
Statute).
8
Gail P. Heagan & Ivan Wood, Gainsharing: Aligning Incentives of Hospitals and
Physicians, AHLA Seminar Materials P02109911 (1999); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(c)(2).
9
See, e.g., § 5007(c)(1); § 646.
10
See, e.g., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2718 (2010) (entitled “Bringing down the cost of health care coverage”); The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702 (2010)
(entitled “Guaranteed availability of coverage”).
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are not sufficient to overcome the legal hurdles that currently
prevent the institution of gainsharing programs. Part V of this
Comment recommends amendments to the law that will better
address these issues. The recommended amendments include
statutory safe harbors for qualifying gainsharing programs, so that the
health care system will enjoy the benefits of gainsharing while the law
protects against potential drawbacks. Part VI concludes.
II. GAINSHARING: HISTORY AND BARRIERS TO ITS APPLICATION IN THE
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
A. History of Gainsharing and Its Introduction into the Healthcare
Setting
Gainsharing was mainly first applied in the context of
11
manufacturing. One of the first gainsharing programs is attributed
to Joseph Scanlon, who established a gainsharing program in the
12
This
1930s to prevent the demise of a troubled company.
gainsharing model, now known as the “Scanlon Plan,” is very similar
to that described supra in Section I. Employees were asked to provide
13
suggestions for improving productivity.
Then a “screening
committee” composed of higher-level employees selected the most
promising suggestions, oversaw their implementation, and evaluated
14
their effectiveness. In addition to simply reducing costs, the success
of the plan was attributed to “employee involvement, bonus payment,
15
and identity with the firm.”
The program enabled workers to
provide insights on the production process and thus encouraged
16
collaboration and teamwork. Because gainsharing ties rewards to
processes and circumstances directly under the workers’ control—in
contrast to profit sharing in which the reward may be tied to external
circumstances—some commentators have argued that gainsharing
17
programs increase employee loyalty. Additionally, front-line workers
have access to more information about day-to-day operations than
managers because front-line workers conduct these operations, so
11

Saver, supra note 3, at 186–87.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-81-22, PRODUCTIVITY SHARING
PROGRAMS: CAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT? 7 (1981), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/79298.pdf.
13
Id. at 8.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Saver, supra note 3, at 188.
17
Id. at 189.
12
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they are likely to be able to provide novel insights on how to save
18
money.
Several factors have influenced the success of gainsharing
initiatives in industries other than healthcare.
For example,
companies that did not establish a culture of “worker participation”
or that did not invest the necessary time and up-front costs have not
19
been successful in establishing gainsharing programs. In a 1999
study, researchers examined the likelihood of survival of 211
20
gainsharing programs.
Dong-One Kim, a professor of Industrial
Relations and Human Resource Management at Korea University
Business School, found that the programs most likely to survive were
those that: employees had approved with a vote; included re-training
of employees and training of new employees; involved “small bonus
groups” under 100 employees; were instituted in a “labor-intensive
organization[]” and in a financially healthy organization; and
21
involved a “major capital investment.” He also found an indirect
22
effect related to the positive performance of the program.
Unsurprisingly, the programs that were most successful in saving costs
23
and compensating employees were most likely to survive.
Although healthcare may not be considered “labor-intensive,”
the other factors that Kim identified can apply to gainsharing
programs in the healthcare industry. Those instituting gainsharing in
a healthcare setting can encourage the program’s success by having
physicians vote on the program, ensuring proper training, and
limiting the bonus groups to fewer than 100 physicians. Additionally,
one must consider the financial health of the entity and the financial
assets available when establishing a gainsharing program.
Healthcare providers can adopt practices from the
manufacturing setting—such as gainsharing—to improve efficiency
of healthcare delivery without sacrificing quality of care. Shouldice
Hernia Hospital in Toronto, Canada is a well-known example of this
principle. Shouldice applies strategies from manufacturing such as
specialization through limiting its area of practice to only one
medical condition, quality control through peer supervision, and

18

Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 198.
20
Dong-One Kim, Determinants of the Survival of Gainsharing Programs, 53 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 21, 21 (1999).
21
Id. at 34–36.
22
Id. at 37.
23
Id.
19
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standardization of surgical procedures.
Shouldice’s success and
lowered costs are also attributable to the fact that Shouldice does not
operate on high-risk patients, such as those who are overweight or
25
have other medical conditions. But Shouldice’s success illustrates
that manufacturing principles are applicable to healthcare to reduce
26
costs without compromising patient outcomes.
Legal barriers have curtailed the establishment of gainsharing
27
arrangements in the healthcare industry. In 1999, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), published an advisory bulletin stating that
gainsharing arrangements were in direct violation of the federal CMP
28
Statute. The OIG noted that “it would ‘take into consideration in
exercising its enforcement discretion whether a gainsharing
29
arrangement was terminated expeditiously,’” suggesting that active
gainsharing arrangements should be shut down quickly in order to
avoid penalties.
In 2001, the outlook for gainsharing in healthcare became more
favorable—the OIG provided an advisory opinion indicating that it
would not impose penalties on a group of cardiologists who had
24

Peter Behr, Rx for the Economy?, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1986, at E1.
Id.
26
For example, a 2006 article reported that Shouldice’s cost for disposable
surgical items was less than $20 per surgery, compared to $200 to $800 per surgery at
other hospitals. Sharda Prashad, A Cut Above the Rest, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 22, 2006,
at A19. The article also reported that Shouldice’s complication and infection rate
was under 0.5%. Id.
27
Mary Ellen Schneider, Legal Concerns Hinder Adoption of Gainsharing, INTERNAL
MEDICINE NEWS, May 1, 2007, at 50.
28
OIG Special Advisory Bulletin: Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries (July
1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm [hereinafter
OIG Special Advisory Bulletin]. The OIG Special Advisory Bulletin stated that:
While the OIG recognizes that appropriately structured gainsharing
arrangements may offer significant benefits where there is no adverse
impact on the quality of care received by patients, section 1128A(b)(1)
of the [Social Security] Act [which sets forth the CMP law] clearly
prohibits such arrangements. Moreover, regulatory relief from the
CMP prohibition will require statutory authorization.
Id.; see also D. McCarty Thorton et al., Gainsharing: Regulatory Breakthrough, but
Challenges Remain, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, D.C.), 2005
at
3–4,
available
at
http://www.hortyspringer.com/ACPE
/HealthCareFraudReport.pdf. The CMP Statute prohibits hospitals from paying
doctors for “reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries.” OIG Special Advisory Bulletin. Both the hospitals and the doctors
can be liable for penalties of up to $2000 per patient. See id.
29
Thorton et al., supra note 27, at 3 (quoting OIG Special Advisory Bulletin).
25
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30

established a gainsharing program. This opinion created renewed
optimism that gainsharing programs would be permitted in the
31
future. But the OIG identified a number of specific factors that led
32
to this decision.
The factors included: identifying cost-saving
33
initiatives at the outset of the project, which the OIC believed would
promote “transparency”; establishing a plan for monitoring quality of
patient care; setting thresholds for physician reimbursement; and
disclosing to patients that the cardiologists had instituted a
34
gainsharing program. Some of these factors have since been used
for guidance in establishing gainsharing demonstrations and
proposing statutory exceptions to laws that would prevent
35
gainsharing. Richard Saver, a leading scholar in the field of health
law, however, noted that many of the other factors that were
important to the OIG in making its decision would be extremely

30

Id. at 3–4; see Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940, 14
(HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001).
31
Thorton et al., supra note 27, at 3–4..
32
Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940, 8–10 (HHSOIG Jan.
11, 2001). In a more recent opinion, the OIG noted that it was still concerned about
possible risks of gainsharing, including:
(i) stinting on patient care, (ii) cherry-picking healthy patients and
steering sicker (and more costly) patients to hospitals that do not offer
gainsharing opportunities, (iii) payments in return for patient
referrals, and (iv) unfair competition (as hospitals race to offer more
and better gainsharing programs to foster physician loyalty and attract
referrals).
2009 Health L. Handbook § 8:46 (citation omitted). These concerns are discussed
infra Part II.D.
33
The initiatives included nineteen measures for reducing costs, “fourteen
recommendations that involve opening packaged items only as needed during a
procedure.” Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan.
11, 2001). Four of the initiatives involved using less expensive products. Id. One
initiative involved limiting the “use of Aprotinin—a medication currently given to
many surgical patients pre-operatively to prevent hemorrhaging—to patients that are
at higher risk of perioperative hemorrhage as indicated by objective clinical
standards.” Id.
34
Saver, supra note 3, at 168.
35
See Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement
and Savings, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., available at
https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko_Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May
_2011.pdf (2011) at 2, 10 (discussing quality of care data and caps on payments to
physicians at two gainsharing demonstration sites); Wilson Hayman, Is Gainsharing
Finally Here to Stay? Recent Advisory Opinions and Proposed Stark Exception Appear to Pave
the Way, THE NAT’L L. REV. 4 (2009), available at http://www.natlawreview.com
/article/gainsharing-finally-here-to-stay-recent-advisory-opinions-and-propo
(discussing a proposed exception to Stark).
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36

difficult to replicate. For example, the doctors involved were all
part of “the same legally organized medical group,” and the costsaving measures were already defined and supported in the
37
literature.
The federal government has sought to examine the feasibility
and effectiveness of gainsharing programs through several
38
demonstration programs.
Section 646 of the Medicare
Modernization Act (MMA), which was enacted in 2003, called for
gainsharing demonstration programs in up to seventy-two hospitals as
part of the Physician-Hospital Collaboration Demonstration
39
(PHCD). The MMA provided for a waiver of the CMP Statute for
40
participating hospitals.
Indiana Health Information Exchange
(IHIE) and North Carolina Community Care Networks instituted
programs.
But the programs focused on pay-for-performance

36

Saver, supra note 3, at 170.
Id. at 170.
38
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4
(2006); Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066
(2003).
39
Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/
downloads/MMA646_FactSheet.pdf; Gainsharing Gets Boost Projects Still Lack Funding,
MODERN PHYSICIAN, http://www.modernphysician.com/article/
20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579 (June 9, 2008); Michael Romano, Gainsharing Demo a Go; CMS Details Physician-hospital Collaboration Project, MODERN
PHYSICIAN (Oct. 1, 2006) at 5, available at http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.shu.edu
/ps/i.do?&id=GALE% 7CA154247530&v=2.1&u=setonhallu&it=r&p=HRCA&sw=w.
According to the MMA:
[T]he Secretary shall establish a 5-year demonstration program under
which the Secretary shall approve demonstration projects that examine
health delivery factors that encourage the delivery of improved quality
in patient care, including— (1) the provision of incentives to improve
the safety of care provided to beneficiaries; (2) the appropriate use of
best practice guidelines by providers and services by beneficiaries; (3)
reduced scientific uncertainty in the delivery of care through the
examination of variations in the utilization and allocation of services,
and outcomes measurement and research; (4) encourage shared
decision making between providers and patients; (5) the provision of
incentives for improving the quality and safety of care and achieving
the efficient allocation of resources; (6) the appropriate use of
culturally and ethnically sensitive health care delivery; and (7) the
financial effects on the health care marketplace of altering the
incentives for care delivery and changing the allocation of resources.
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2006).
40
§ 1395cc-3. The MMA provides that “the Secretary may waive such
requirements of titles XI and XVIII as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
the demonstration program established under this section.” Id.
37
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measures in general, rather than specifically on gainsharing. Under
the PHCD, the New Jersey Hospital Association planned to establish
42
Although the
gainsharing programs in eight of its hospitals.
hospitals received CMS approval to participate in the demonstration,
43
they did not obtain OIG approval. Robert Wood Johnson University
Hospital and St. Francis Medical Center, which were not participating
44
in the program, sued HHS and CMS to enjoin the demonstration.
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey found that the
demonstration project was a violation of the CMP Statute and,
because the hospitals had not obtained OIG approval, granted the
45
injunction.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) created a
demonstration program specifically for gainsharing initiatives, which
required CMS to establish gainsharing programs in up to six
46
hospitals. The DRA provided a number of safe harbors for these
pilot programs to ensure that they would not be in violation of
sections 1128A, 1128B, and 1877 of the Social Security Act, which
deal with physician inducement, remuneration, and financial
47
relationships, respectively. In order to be chosen, applicants to the
41

Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ.A.04-142(JWB),
2004 WL 3210732, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2004).
43
Id. at *11–12.
44
Id. at *1.
45
Id. at *13.
46
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4
(2006); DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/DemonstrationProjects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads//
DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf. The DRA provided that:
The Secretary shall establish under this section a qualified gainsharing
demonstration program under which the Secretary shall approve
demonstration projects by not later than November 1, 2006, to test and
evaluate methodologies and arrangements between hospitals and
physicians designed to govern the utilization of inpatient hospital
resources and physician work to improve the quality and efficiency of
care provided to Medicare beneficiaries and to develop improved
operational and financial hospital performance with sharing of
remuneration as specified in the project. Such projects shall be
operational by not later than January 1, 2007.
Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(a).
47
Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(c)(1).
An incentive payment made by a hospital to a physician under and in
accordance with a demonstration project shall not constitute— (A)
remuneration for purposes of section 1128B of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b); (B) a payment intended to induce a physician to
42
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program were required to have an organized and specific
implementation plan and a method to carefully measure quality of
48
care and efficiency. The demonstrations were also required to be
budget neutral in order to ensure that gainsharing actually produced
49
savings.
CMS established a protocol for evaluating budget
50
neutrality. Two medical centers participated: Beth Israel Medical
Center in New York and Charleston Area Medical Center in West
51
Virginia. The outcome of these programs is discussed in Part II.C
infra.
reduce or limit services to a patient entitled to benefits under Medicare
or a State plan approved under title XIX of such Act in violation of
section 1128A of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a–7a); or (C) a financial
relationship for purposes of section 1877 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
1395nn).
Id.
48

DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, supra note 46.
The DRA required demonstration projects to meet the following criteria:
(1) Arrangement for remuneration as share of savings.—The
demonstration project shall involve an arrangement between a hospital
and a physician under which the hospital provides remuneration to the
physician that represents solely a share of the savings incurred directly
as a result of collaborative efforts between the hospital and the
physician. (2) Written Plan Agreement.—The demonstration project
shall be conducted pursuant to a written agreement that—(A) is
submitted to the Secretary prior to implementation of the project; and
(B) includes a plan outlining how the project will achieve
improvements in quality and efficiency. (3) Patient Notification.—The
demonstration project shall include a notification process to inform
patients who are treated in a hospital participating in the project of the
participation of the hospital in such project. (4) Monitoring Quality
and Efficiency of Care.—The demonstration project shall provide
measures to ensure that the quality and efficiency of care provided to
patients who are treated in a hospital participating in the
demonstration project is continuously monitored to ensure that such
quality and efficiency is maintained or improved. (5) Independent
Review.—The demonstration project shall certify, prior to
implementation, that the elements of the demonstration project are
reviewed by an organization that is not affiliated with the hospital or
the physician participating in the project. (6) Referral Limitations.—
The demonstration project shall not be structured in such a manner as
to reward any physician participating in the project on the basis of the
volume or value of referrals to the hospital by the physician.
Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(b).
49
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GAINSHARING
DEMONSTRATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND SAVINGS 12
(Mar.
28,
2011),
https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/
Buczko_Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May_2011.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
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B. Gainsharing Models as Applied to Healthcare
Although gainsharing can generally be described as physicians
suggesting and implementing cost-saving measures and the hospital
sharing the savings with the physicians, as in the Scanlon plan, there
are a number of different forms that such a program may take. One
factor to consider is the method of determining compensation. For
example, under the “Cost Management Contracts” model, physicians
may be compensated for time spent participating in a committee to
determine how to implement cost savings rather than based upon the
52
amount of money saved. If the incentive payments are tied to the
amount saved, those implementing the program must decide how to
53
distribute savings. Under other models, a hospital might distribute
savings among those physicians within the practice area in which
savings were recognized—the “Cost Per DRG” model—or those
responsible for savings based on procedure type grouping—the “Cost
54
Per Aggregate ICD-9.”
In another model, the “Specialty
Gainsharing” model, changes are implemented at the specialty level
and the chair for the specialty determines how savings are
55
distributed.
Another program, “Line-item Gainsharing,” involves
56
the hospital or a manager identifying the most expensive items.
Physicians focus on reducing the cost and are directly paid a part of
57
the savings.
Other forms of gainsharing reduce or entirely eliminate the
payments to physicians. In “department management gainsharing,” a
manager or group of managers is hired to reduce costs in each
58
department and is paid a “predetermined management fee.” Saver
has suggested a “three-way gainsharing” model in which a percentage
of savings is retained by the hospital, a percentage is distributed to
participating physicians, and the remainder is either distributed to
59
patients as refunds or placed into a fund. Patient representatives
52

Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
See id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
59
Saver, supra note 3, at 229. This is also very similar to the “reinvestment of cost
savings” model described by Heagan and Wood, in which a portion of the savings is
placed in a fund and physicians can suggest uses for it. Heagan & Wood, supra note
8. This model takes a similar form as Saver’s model, but does not necessarily serve
the same purpose. Id.
53
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would manage the fund and use the money to directly improve
patients’ experiences in the hospital. For example, such funds may
be used for subsidizing items that are not covered by Medicare and
Medicaid for needy patients, adding patient libraries, providing
60
internet access to patients, or upgrading family waiting rooms. The
goal of such projects would be to convey to patients that the hospital
and doctors are not benefitting from gainsharing at their expense
61
and that patient welfare is a priority.
C. Potential Benefits and Arguments for Gainsharing as Applied to the
Healthcare Industry
Commentators have identified gainsharing as one method for
62
reducing healthcare costs while preserving quality of care.
Currently, Medicare and Medicaid compensate hospitals using a set
63
per-patient fee based on a patient’s diagnosis. The fee does not
64
depend on the amount or type of care that the patient requires. On
the other hand, physicians are compensated for each service
65
performed. This creates an incentive for hospitals to reduce costs as
66
much as possible while doctors do not have such an incentive.
Gainsharing aligns the hospital’s incentives with the doctors’
incentives under the common goal of reducing costs while
67
maintaining quality of care.
Physicians are encouraged to help
hospitals save money and are not as affected by the negative financial
implications—and the potential compromise to patient care—
68
associated with reducing the number of services.
Saver argues that obtaining physician involvement is extremely
important to reducing costs because “[n]early all the hot-button areas
of hospital cost escalation . . . drug costs, nursing costs, technology
costs, etc.—can rise or fall depending upon the practice patterns of
69
the hospital’s staff physicians.” As discussed above, those on the
front lines are often those with the most insight into the best ways to

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Saver, supra note 3, at 229.
Id. at 230.
See id. at 147.
Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543–44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Saver, supra note 3, at 154.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 176.
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70

reduce costs and increase productivity. This observation also calls
into question the potential effectiveness of “department management
71
gainsharing,” which eliminates physicians from the process.
Gainsharing may be more likely to gain physician “buy-in” than other
cost-saving measures because, rather than imposing changes on
physicians, the hospital asks for their input and allows them to use
72
clinical judgment.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in favor of gainsharing is
the success of pilot programs. A gainsharing program was instituted
73
at Pinnacle Health Systems in Pennsylvania program in 2003. It
reportedly saved $5.7 million during the three years that it ran, and
attributed the savings largely to negotiating with vendors for better
74
prices on medical supplies.
Also, the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) cited the PHCD and Medicare
Gainsharing demonstration favorably, noting that “preliminary
results indicate the hospitals and physicians achieved improved
clinical and patient outcomes on measures such as decreased length
of stay for inpatient care, which may result in savings to Medicare”
and that “preliminary results indicate that the hospitals achieved
75
internal savings due to increased efficiency.”
Results from the pilot program at Beth Israel Medical Center
show that, since its demonstration began in 2006, it has saved over
$42 million and has distributed $8 million of the savings to
76
participating physicians. Beth Israel reports that patient outcomes
77
have not suffered since the project began. Under the program,
individual physicians, either an attending physician or a surgeon,
78
were given financial responsibility for individual patients. Incentive
payments were conditioned on maintaining quality standards,
70

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
72
Saver, supra note 3, at 215.
73
See Joseph Mantone, Gain-sharing Seems to be Working, But Research Shows Stent
Savings Come From Negotiations, Not Implementations, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 5,
2006, at 33.
74
Id.
75
CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE REQUEST FOR APPLICATION 4 (2011), available at
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Bundled-Payments-for-Care-ImprovementRequest-for-Applications.pdf.
76
Phyllis Maguire, Results are in: Gainsharing Works, TODAY’S HOSPITALIST, Feb.
2011, http://todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles_read&cnt=1168.
77
Id.
78
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 8.
71
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including not having an increase in readmission rates, adverse events,
or instances of malpractice, and meeting certain specialty-specific
79
quality measures. CMS reported on the outcome of the first year of
80
the demonstration. During the first year, Beth Israel distributed
81
$585,000 of the savings among the 309 participating physicians. The
savings were largely attributable to reduced length of stay in the
82
hospital. Although total cost of hospitalization decreased, costs in
83
the ICU increased 32% during the pilot. It is unclear whether this
84
increase was related to the program. Beth Israel reported that it
plans to expand the program to the ICU in order to control these
85
costs.
Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) also established a
gainsharing program under the demonstration program authorized
86
by DRA Section 5007. The program focused on implementing cost87
saving initiatives with cardiac diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). As
expected, gainsharing incentive payments to individual physicians
were contingent upon actual cost savings per episode of care and
quality of care outcomes that did not show a statistically significant
88
decline after the cost-saving measures were implemented. CAMC
distributed about $165,000 of the savings among approximately 100
89
physicians during the first year of the demonstration program.
Going forward, additional hospitals will begin to participate in
90
gainsharing demonstration programs.
The acute care episode
(ACE) demonstration project involves five hospitals within the Baptist

79

Id.
Id.
81
Id. at 10.
82
Michelle Grey Campion, Can Gainsharing Impact Cost Savings in the ICU?
Hospital-Wide Analysis Hints at Impressive Rewards, ANESTHESIOLOGY NEWS (May 2011),
available
at
http://www.anesthesiologynews.com/
ViewArticle.aspx?d=Policy+%26+Management&d_id=3&i=May+2011&i_id=729&a_id
=17116.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 7.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 11.
90
Rebecca Vesely, An ACE in the Deck? Bundled-Payment Demo Shows Returns,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 7, 2011, at 32–33; 12 N.J. Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save
Money, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news
/health/2009-08-19-hospital-costs_N.htm.
80
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91

Health System in San Antonio, Texas. The project began in 2009
92
and is planned to last for three years. Also in 2009, a group of
twelve hospitals in New Jersey received CMS approval to begin a
93
gainsharing demonstration program. CMS approved the expansion
of the program from twelve hospitals to thirty-three hospital sites, as
part of the “Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative”
94
under PPACA. Finally, the Greater New York Hospital Association
will begin a gainsharing program in which Medicare would “pay
hospitals and physicians at current rates” for the first six months of
the program while the hospitals and doctors developed and instituted
95
cost-saving measures.
Thereafter, Medicare would receive a
96
“discount.” This program is part of the “CMS Bundled Payment for
97
Care Improvement Initiative.”
Even outside of healthcare settings, gainsharing programs may
98
not be successful or long lasting, as Dong-One Kim found. It largely
will be left to the hospitals to ensure the success of their gainsharing
programs. Previous demonstration projects have indicated that
gainsharing programs can succeed in the healthcare setting.
D. Policy Concerns and Efficacy Barriers
A frequent argument against gainsharing programs is that they
create a perverse incentive for doctors to use lower quality products
91

Id.
Id.
93
12 N.J. Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save Money, supra note 90. New Jersey
Hospital Association (NJHA) led the effort to obtain CMS approval for the
demonstration program.
Richard Pizzi, CMS Approves New Jersey Gainsharing
Demonstration
Project,
HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS,
(Aug.
19,
2009),
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/
cms-approves-new-jersey-gainsharing-demonstration-project. NJHA had previously
received approval to conduct a gainsharing demonstration program in 2003. Robert
Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ. A.04-142 (JWB), 2004 WL
3210732, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2004). The U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey deemed the program to be a violation of the CMP Statute because the
hospitals had not received OIG approval. Id. at *12. See supra notes 36–39 and
accompanying text.
94
NJHA Receives Federal Approval to Expand Promising Effort to Reduce Healthcare
Costs, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/njhareceives-federal-approval-to-expand-promising-effort-to-reduce-healthcare-costs189369961.html.
95
CMS Unveils Bundled Payment Models, GREATER N.Y. HOSP. ASS’N (Sept. 12,
2011), http://www.gnyha.org/7652/Default.aspx.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Kim, supra note 20, at 34–36.
92
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or to withhold medically necessary services in order to save money.
There are a number of protections to prevent this from occurring.
First, gainsharing demonstration programs require physicians to
meet benchmarks in terms of clinical outcomes, thus eliminating the
100
potential for such perverse incentives.
Physicians also have other
incentives to avoid a reduction in quality of care, such as concern for
patient well-being, concern for professional reputation, and fear of
malpractice litigation. These incentives would likely outweigh the
incentive for additional financial remuneration for a large number of
physicians.
Finally, those programs currently approved as
101
demonstrations require long-term measurement of cost-savings.
Doctors will recognize that reducing quality of care for short-term
savings will lead to increased overall cost in the long-term as patients
will likely require extended hospital stays, treatment for
102
complications, or readmissions to the hospital.
Opponents of gainsharing also argue that seeking to reduce
services directly violates doctors’ “fiduciary and ethical duties to their
103
patients.” This concern is the basis for the OIG’s interpretation of
104
Clinical evidence shows that in certain
the Stark and CMP laws.
instances, reducing treatment or substituting a lower cost alternative
105
can be associated with improved clinical outcomes.
For example,
the goal of disease-management programs is to treat patients more

99

One policy paper reports negative consequences of requiring physicians to use
particular devices as follows:
In Iowa, doctors constrained by a hospital’s agreement have reported
having to transfer patients to other hospitals in order to get them the
brand of medical device that they need. In Pennsylvania, a physician
has sued his hospital for using a standardization contract as a facade
for receiving illegal kickbacks from a major manufacturer.
MED. DEVICE MFGS. ASS’N, CONGRESS SHOULD PROHIBIT DEVICE CONTRACT GAINSHARING
TO PROTECT PERSONALIZED PATIENT CARE AND MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION, available at
http://www.medicaldevices.org/system/files/Hill.LeaveBehind.Final_000_0.pdf?dow
nload=1.
100
See, e.g., Sachin H. Jain & Daniel Roble, Gainsharing in Healthcare: Meeting the
Quality-of-Care Challenge, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Mar. 2008, at 78
(discussing quality measurements as a safeguard); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, available at
https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf.
101
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. supra note 49; Medicare Health Care
Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
102
Saver, supra note 3, at 207.
103
Id. at 199.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 202–03.
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106

effectively but with fewer episodes of care.
Because of this
objective, disease-management initiatives may technically violate the
107
Stark and CMP laws.
Potential downsides to gainsharing may be avoided by adopting
some of the OIG’s requirements. For example, the OIG has
suggested that there is an incentive for “cherry picking,” keeping
healthy patients while referring unhealthy patients, who are more
108
expensive to treat, to other institutions.
The OIG requires
documentation of the types of patients seen by the hospital to ensure
that hospitals and doctors do not turn away sick patients in order to
109
save money.
Also, adjusting for the severity of the patient’s
condition will counteract any incentive to turn away unhealthy
patients because there would not be any “penalty” for providing the
110
necessary treatments associated with caring for a higher-risk patient.
There is also a concern that physicians who are already efficient will
not be rewarded for efficiency, but programs can be designed to
reward those who maintain efficiency goals, rather than meeting ever
111
increasing goals.
The type of risks associated with a gainsharing program will
depend upon the type of gainsharing initiatives that a healthcare
provider adopts. For example, the favorable advisory opinion that
the OIG issued in 2001 involved gainsharing initiatives in a cardiology
112
department.
One of the measures adopted by the cardiology
department involved not opening surgical supplies prior to a
patient’s surgery so that the instruments would not be wasted if the
113
surgeon did not need them.
Such a measure does not encourage
physicians to withhold care or otherwise change the way that patients
are treated. Similarly, cutting costs through purchasing items in bulk
would not encourage physicians to “cherry-pick” patients or otherwise
negatively impact the way that patients are treated.
An additional concern is that gainsharing initiatives would limit
106

Id. at 212–13.
Id.
108
Thorton et al., supra note 28, at 3.
109
Hayman, supra note 35.
110
See Method and Sys. for Evaluating a Physician’s Economic Performance and
Gainsharing of Physician Services, U.S. Patent No. 7,640,173 B2, at [3] (filed Dec. 29,
2009).
111
See id. at [3–4].
112
Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11,
2001).
113
Id.
107
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the treatment options available to physicians, thus limiting their
freedom to make clinical decisions and negatively impacting quality
114
In fact, this
of care through a de facto forced standardization.
result would directly contravene the purpose of the CMP Statute.
Saver argues that imposing strict limitations on gainsharing can have
the same effect: “[p]hysicians often have to respond flexibly and with
some degree of innovation and experimentation as to choosing
different treatment paths, depending upon the particular needs and
115
clinical circumstances of the individual patient.”
Additionally, gainsharing creates the concern that excessive
standardization of medical devices will allow manufacturers to
increase market share and reduce competition, eventually enabling
them to increase prices. There has been opposition, especially from
device manufacturers, who argue that standardization will stifle
116
innovation by destroying the market for new products.
A
counterargument is that, at least when each contract is expired,
hospitals and physicians will continually look for ways to save costs,
and perhaps will be more aggressive in renegotiating contracts as a
117
result. Also, if the programs are limited to individual departments
within hospitals, each implementing its own cost-savings measures,
standardization would be limited and negative effects on competition
would be less likely.
The risk that gainsharing programs will limit physicians’
freedom or stifle innovation depends upon the size of the
gainsharing programs and the level of freedom that physicians retain
when deciding which products to use for individual patients. If the
114

Id.
Saver, supra note 3, at 206.
116
Paula DeJohn, Growing Popularity of Gainsharing Brings Pushback from
Manufacturers, 31 HOSP. MATERIALS MGMT. 8 (2006); Gainsharing: Still the Wrong
Answer,
BIOMET
(June
9,
2010
7:07
AM),
http://www.biomet.com/corporate/ceoBlog/postDetail.cfm?postID=58;
MED.
DEVICE MFGS. ASS’N, supra note 99.
117
One might argue that gainsharing presents the same risk of consolidations
and reversed incentives that has occurred in the context of Group Purchasing
Organizations (GPOs). Mariah Blake, Dirty Medicine, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug.
2010,
available
at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.blake.html.
GPOs are
organizations formed to purchase medical supplies in bulk at a discounted rate. Id.
In 1986, GPOs were granted an exemption from the AKS, which made it lawful for
suppliers to pay GPOs “fees,” which were essentially a portion of their revenue. “This
created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers.” Id.; Frank
Pasquale, Understanding Medicine’s Middlemen, BALKINIZATION (July 12, 2010),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/understanding-medicines-middlemen.html.
115
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programs are limited to individual departments within hospitals, each
implementing its own cost-saving measures, standardization would be
limited. If, however, cost-saving measures were implemented on a
broader basis, standardization, and possible detrimental effects on
innovation, would be possible.
III. LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GAINSHARING
PROGRAMS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS
A number of legal barriers, including regulations of tax-exempt
entities, the AKS, the Stark Law, and the CMP Statute, have curtailed
the establishment of gainsharing programs in healthcare. In recent
years, the OIG’s inconsistent decisions about whether it will enforce
these laws against hospital gainsharing programs have compounded
118
this problem.
A. Violations Related to Hospitals’ Tax-exempt Status
Tax-exempt organizations may not use their earnings to benefit
any “person with a personal and private interest in the activities of the
119
organization” including doctors.
Tax-exempt organizations also
may not serve any private interest unless the private interest is
120
incidental to serving the public interest. In order to be incidental
to serving the public interest, the private interest “must be both
121
qualitatively and quantitatively incidental.”
“Qualitatively
incidental” means that the interest is a “necessary concomitant of the
activity that benefits the public at large and the benefit cannot be
122
achieved without necessarily benefiting certain private individuals.”
“Quantitatively incidental” means that the interest is “neither direct
nor substantial in comparison to the benefit conferred on the public
123
by the activity.”
The penalty to a physician or other individual
deemed a “disqualified person” for violating this law is 25% of the
excess benefit and, “if the excess benefit is not corrected, an
124
additional tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit.”
118

Barry F. Rosen, Commentary: Clearer Guidance on Gainsharing Would Lower Costs,
DAILY RECORD, July 7, 2009.
119
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978); Rev. Rul. 70-186,
1970-1 C.B. 128; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986).
123
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec.
18, 1978).
124
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
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It is unclear whether gainsharing payments to physicians would
qualify as qualitatively incidental. Cost-saving initiatives could be
instituted without providing the financial benefits of gainsharing to
doctors, which means that the benefit to the public—reduced
healthcare costs—could be achieved without benefitting private
individuals. This could be accomplished under the “reinvestment of
cost savings” model, or a variation on the “three-way costs savings
model,” both discussed in Part II.B supra. If the doctors’ shares of the
savings were reinvested in patient projects, hospitals and doctors
could avoid any private benefit. Importantly, however, gainsharing
programs may be less successful if physicians do not have financial
incentives to cut costs.
According to some commentators, other forms of gainsharing
125
can be modeled to comply with the regulations. In order to avoid
penalties, gainsharing programs must pay doctors a reasonable
compensation, taking into account the benefit conferred and the
126
“fair market value” of the doctors’ services.
The doctors’
compensation must be “the result of arm’s length bargaining . . .
127
[and] must not be merely a device to distribute profits to insiders.”
The payments must also be “based on personally performed services,
and tied to quality and efficiency measures monitored by an
128
129
independent expert.” A safe harbor also exists, but it contains a
number of requirements related to the governance of the hospital,
130
and so it is unlikely to protect gainsharing programs.
Finally, a
program may also be deemed to be in compliance with the law based

125
126
127
128
129

See id.
Id.
Id.
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 489.
Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (1997); Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at

489.
130

In order to satisfy this safe harbor, a hospital would have to ensure that:
(a) Not more than 20 percent of the voting power of the governing
body of the qualified user in the aggregate is vested in the service
provider and its directors, officers, shareholders, and employees; (b)
Overlapping board members do not include the chief executive
officers of the service provider or its governing body or the qualified
user or its governing body; and (c) The qualified user and the service
provider under the contract are not related parties, as defined in §
1.150-1(b).
Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (1997). Although a hospital may fall under these
exceptions, it would be unlikely that a hospital would re-organize its governance in
order to satisfy the safe harbor.

MARTINGANO-REINHART (DO NOT DELETE)

1344

10/22/2013 2:24 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1325

131

on the relevant “facts and circumstances”.
B. Anti-Kickback Statute

The federal AKS imposes criminal penalties and potential fines
on:
whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind . . . in return for referring an individual to a person for
the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item
or service for which payment may be made in whole or in
132
part under a Federal health care program.
Gainsharing programs can violate this statute because gainsharing
may incentivize physicians to refer patients to the hospital, including
Medicare and Medicaid patients whose care will be paid for as part of
133
a federal healthcare program.
This incentive may exist because
increasing the volume of patients would increase the overall savings
134
included in the gainsharing program.
As of 2009, there were no safe harbors that protected
gainsharing programs from liability for violating the AKS, but
135
hospitals could seek an advisory opinion from the OIG. The statute
does contain a safe harbor for “[p]ersonal services and management

131

Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 489 (citing I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling
200926005 (Mar. 17, 2009)).
132
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2012); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
133
Saver, supra note 3, at 171 n.100.
134
Id.
135
Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at 489. Since 2001, the OIG has issued 13
advisory opinions regarding gainsharing programs, finding that each program would
or could potentially violate the CMP Statute and AKS but stating that the OIG would
not impose sanctions. Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, 2009 WL 2371264
(HHSOIG June 23, 2009), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-15, 2008 WL 6067525
(HHSOIG Oct. 6, 2008), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-09, 2008 WL 6067519
(HHSOIG Jul. 31, 2008), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-21, 2007 WL 6400848
(HHSOIG Dec. 28, 2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-22, 2007 WL 6400849
(HHSOIG Dec. 28, 2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 06-22, 2006 WL 6252293
(HHSOIG Nov. 9, 2006), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-06, 2005 WL 6289869
(HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-05, 2005 WL 6289868
(HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-04, 2005 WL 6289867
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-03, 2005 WL 6289866
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-02, 2005 WL 6289865
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-01, 2005 WL 6289864
(HHSOIG Jan. 28, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940
(HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001), 1.
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136

contracts.” The safe harbor states that the term “remuneration,” as
defined by the statute, does not include payments made to an agent
137
for the agent’s services, pursuant to an agency agreement. But the
regulation’s requirements would preclude many gainsharing
agreements. For example, the “aggregate compensation paid to the
138
agent over the term of the agreement [must be] set in advance.”
Many gainsharing models determine the amount of compensation
after the cost-savings initiatives have been instituted based on the
139
amount of money saved.
Although the amount could be set in
advance based on a different metric—e.g., the number of hours
dedicated to meeting and developing ideas—or upon the projected
amount of savings, setting the amount in advance could diminish the
level of incentive to follow through with the cost-saving initiative.
Thus, it is unlikely that any of the safe harbors sufficiently protect
140
gainsharing programs from violating the AKS.
C. Stark Law
The federal Stark Law prohibits physicians with a financial
relationship with a particular “entity” from referring patients to the
entity for services that would otherwise be paid using Medicaid or
141
Medicare funds. It also prohibits “entities” from making claims for
142
The statute defines “financial
payment under such circumstances.
136

42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
138
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d).
139
See Part II.B supra.
140
Additionally, there are some state statutes that are similar to the federal AKS,
and therefore hospitals must be cognizant of the risk of violating state law as well as
federal law when instituting a gainsharing program. Heagan & Wood, supra note 8;
see, e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.054 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-113-60 (1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-4 (West 2007). This issue, however, is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
141
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (2006).
142
Id. Entity is defined as
[a] physician’s sole practice or a practice of multiple physicians or any
other person, sole proprietorship, public or private agency or trust,
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, foundation,
nonprofit corporation, or unincorporated association that furnishes
DHS [designated health services]. An entity does not include the
referring physician himself or herself, but does include his or her
medical practice.
42 C.F.R. § 411.351. Designated health services includes:
(i) Clinical laboratory services. (ii) Physical therapy, occupational
therapy, and outpatient speech-language pathology services. (iii)
Radiology and certain other imaging services. (iv) Radiation therapy
137
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relationship” to include: “a compensation arrangement . . . between
143
The statute carves out an
the physician . . . and the entity.”
exception for employment relationships in which the physician is
144
compensated for “identifiable services.”
It also includes an
145
exception for “personal services” under a written agreement. There
also is a “physician incentive plan exception,” but payment cannot be
made as “an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary
146
services.”
An additional exception was proposed in 2008 that would have
allowed hospitals to institute gainsharing programs for up to three
147
years, provided the programs met certain conditions.
The
finalization of the rule, however, was delayed and the American
Hospital Association, Federation of American Hospitals, and the
Association of American Medical Colleges recommended changes to
the rule because it contained too many restrictions to “allow for
innovation and the types of physician-hospital efforts to maximize
148
quality of health care.” This rule has not been instituted to date.
This may add to hospitals’ hesitation in establishing gainsharing
programs. Currently, hospitals may run gainsharing programs that
149
the OIG has approved via advisory opinions.
The OIG only issues
150
opinions as to the AKS and CMP statute, but it has generally not
enforced the Stark Law against gainsharing programs that have
151
received such approvals.
But should it promulgate an exception,
services and supplies. (v) Durable medical equipment and supplies.
(vi) Parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies. (vii)
Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies. (viii) Home
health services. (ix) Outpatient prescription drugs. (x) Inpatient and
outpatient hospital services.
Id.
143

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2)(B) (2006).
Id. § 1395nn(e).
145
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
146
Id. The term “medically necessary” is not defined in either the statute or the
OIG’s decisions, but Medicare defines “medically necessary” services as: “Services or
supplies that are needed for the diagnosis or treatment of [a patient’s] medical
condition and meet accepted standards of medical practice.” Home Health Agency and
Home
Care
Glossary
of
Definitions,
MEDICARE,
http://www.medicare.gov/homehealthcompare/(S(vfj5vd55qyihdqbiikpxu4rd))/
Resources/Glossary.aspx?Choice=M (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
147
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 487–88.
148
Id. at 488 (citing Hospital Industry Groups Urge CMS To Ease Use of Gainsharing
Deals, Revisit Proposal, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) No. 13 (Feb. 25, 2009)).
149
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 488.
150
Rosen, supra note 118.
151
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 488.
144
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programs already in existence could find themselves in violation of
152
the exception if the programs do not meet the requirements.
D. Civil Monetary Penalties Statute
Under the CMP Statute, hospitals may not directly or indirectly
compensate doctors for “reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services provided”
153
to Medicare or Medicaid patients. The statute provides for a fine of
154
up to $2000 per patient for both the doctor and the hospital.
Congress passed the CMP Statute after creating the Medicare
Prospective Payment System (PPS), which reimbursed hospitals for
treating Medicare patients on a per-patient basis, rather than on a
155
fee-for-service basis. Under a per-patient payment system, a hospital
receives a set amount of money for each patient treated, based on the
patient’s diagnosis and regardless of the amount or type of care
156
provided. In contrast, payment on a fee-for-service basis means that
a physician is compensated for each treatment given to the patient so
that treatment costs for a particular condition will vary from patient
157
to patient and from doctor to doctor.
Medicare continued to
reimburse doctors on a fee-for-service basis even after Medicare
158
began reimbursing hospitals on a per-patient basis.
Therefore,
there was concern that hospitals would attempt to reduce the costs
associated with patient care by paying doctors to reduce the services
159
rendered.
The CMP Statute does not define the terms “reduce or limit” or
“services,” and, in a Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG adopted a
broad interpretation of the statute, as applied to “any physician
incentive plan that conditions hospital payments to physicians or
physician groups on savings attributable to reduction in hospital costs
160
for treatment.” The OIG does not assume that the services must be
medically necessary in order for the statute to apply: “In our view, this
interpretation is plainly wrong. Simply put, the language of the
statute refers to ‘services,’ not ‘medically necessary services,’ and
152

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012); see also Saver, supra note 3, at 155.
154
§ 1320a-7a; see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.
155
Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543–44.
156
Id. at 543.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 543–44.
160
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
153

MARTINGANO-REINHART (DO NOT DELETE)

1348

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/22/2013 2:24 PM

[Vol. 43:1325

requires a showing of an intent to induce a reduction of services, not
161
Claiborne recommended that Congress
an actual reduction.”
amend the statute to include the words “medically necessary services,”
thus making it acceptable for hospitals to compensate physicians for
reducing services that are not medically necessary as part of
162
gainsharing programs.
By contrast, managed care organizations (MCOs) are not
allowed to pay doctors to “reduce or limit medically necessary services to
163
Medicare and Medicaid patients.” Thus, MCOs are limited in their
ability to enact gainsharing programs, but not to the same degree
164
The OIG has concluded that the
that hospitals are limited.
difference in wording signifies Congress’s desire to provide MCOs
with some discretion so that they could save costs, while preventing
hospitals from denying any services to Medicare and Medicaid
165
patients.
IV. GAINSHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
PPACA contains several provisions that, while not addressing the
laws discussed above, do aim to promote gainsharing programs.
Notably, § 3022 of PPACA creates the “Medicare Shared Savings
Program,” which would require accountable care organizations
(ACOs) to “have a formal legal structure that would allow the
166
organization to receive and distribute payments for shared savings.”
ACOs are “groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care
providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high
167
quality care to their Medicare patients.”
The Medicare Shared
Savings Program enables Medicare to “share a percentage of the
achieved savings with the ACO” provided the ACO “meet[s] both the
168
quality performance standards and generate[s] shareable savings.”
161

Recent Commentary Distorts HHS OIG’s Gainsharing Bulletin, 1999 WL
34984741
(HHSOIG),
1,
available
at
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/alertsandbulletins/bnagain.htm.
162
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 492.
163
Heagan & Wood, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
164
Saver, supra note 3, at 164–66.
165
Id.
166
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(C) (2006).
167
Accountable Care Organizations Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/ACO/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
168
Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67804 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 425).
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CMS and the OIG have the authority to waive the AKS, Stark Law,
169
and the CMP for ACOs. This program, however, does not include
170
doctors and hospitals that are not part of an ACO.
PPACA also provides additional funding for the gainsharing
demonstration and extends the program, which was set to expire in
171
2010, through 2014 or until the funds are exhausted. Although this
was certainly a step to encourage further demonstration programs,
the trouble is that it requires a very long time to collect data, and
172
even then the amount of data collected is small.
Also, the
demonstration programs’ requirement for budget neutrality may be
too strict, which disallows cost-saving initiatives with high up-front
173
costs mitigated by long-term savings.
PPACA does not specifically remove the legal barriers discussed
above. It also does not address the concerns raised with regard to
Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), under which a gainsharing
program could be found to cause net earnings to “inure to the
benefit of private shareholders or individuals,” jeopardizing the
174
hospital’s tax-exempt status.
With regard to the AKS, PPACA §
6402 creates 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(F), which provides that the
term “remuneration” under the statute does not include “any other
remuneration which promotes access to care and poses a low risk of
harm to patients and Federal health care programs (as defined in
section 1128B(f) and designated by the Secretary under
175
regulations).”
This is unlikely to apply to remuneration for
gainsharing programs, however, because such programs do not
directly “promote access to care.” PPACA also does not include any
amendments to the Stark Law that would create an exception to the

169

See Medicare Program; Waiver Designs in Connection with the Medicare
Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Center, 76 Fed. Reg. 19655, 19656 (Apr.
7, 2011).
170
See generally Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations in the Affordable Care
Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2012) (cautioning that there are risks to pilot
programs such as the influence of special interest groups, and attempting to
“temper” the enthusiasm for ACOs by also discussing the challenges).
171
42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
172
MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, 13 INSIDE
CMS 14 (July 8, 2010).
173
Stuart Guterman & Michelle P. Serber, Enhancing Value in Medicare:
Demonstrations and Other Initiatives to Improve the Program 23 (The Commonwealth
Fund/Alliance for Health Reform Jan. 2007).
174
See supra Part III.A.
175
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6402, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7a(i)(6)(F) (2012).
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176

law for gainsharing programs.
With regard to the CMP Statute,
PPACA includes amendments related to correction of reporting
errors and to the procedures involved in collecting civil monetary
177
penalties; the amendments do not address gainsharing.
PPACA does give CMS the authority to waive the CMP Statute
and the AKS and immunizes these waivers from judicial and
administrative review—according to the chair of the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission—in order to expand the
178
demonstration program.
This is helpful because hospitals seeking
to participate in demonstration programs will no longer be required
to obtain separate approval from the OIG. This provision is
inadequate, however, because it does not address the potential for
gainsharing programs to violate the Stark Law or the tax regulations
and only applies to hospitals participating in demonstration
programs. The OIG itself, in its 1999 Advisory Bulletin, stated that
“case by case determinations by advisory opinions are an inadequate
and inequitable substitute for comprehensive and uniform
179
regulation.”
Additionally, PPACA makes violations of the AKS more risky.
Prior to PPACA, a violation of the AKS could trigger penalties under
the False Claims Act (FCA), which provides for penalties of up to
$11,000 for each fraudulent claim a party submits to the government
180
for reimbursement, but it would not do so automatically.
PPACA
added a provision explicitly stating that a violation of the AKS
181
constitutes a “false or fraudulent claim” under the FCA.
It is unlikely that Congress will permanently amend statutes until
the pilot programs prove to be effective, but the pilot programs thus
182
far have been too small to provide sufficient data.
Although the
additional authority given to CMS may encourage participation in the
183
gainsharing demonstrations, providing statutory safe harbors or
176

The only amendments are related to exemptions for referrals for certain
imaging and scans and “other designated health services . . . that the Secretary deems
appropriate,” and mandating the establishment of procedures for reporting
violations of the law. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6003 (2006); see id. § 18001 Sec. 6409.
177
42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6111 (2010).
178
MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note
172.
179
OIG Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 28.
180
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
181
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012).
182
Id.
183
PPACA “establishes at least 35 pilot programs and demonstrations,” that test
different methods of payment and forms of healthcare delivery. FURROW ET AL.,
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making appropriate amendments to the applicable laws would enable
184
gainsharing on a more widespread basis.
The chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
argued that there are insufficient funds to promote gainsharing
185
demonstrations. The lack of funding creates a “catch-22” whereby
gainsharing is only permitted on a limited basis until pilot data is
available, but limiting the allowable gainsharing programs limits the
186
amount of available pilot data.
Enacting statutory changes will
187
make hospitals more willing to invest in gainsharing programs.
Some have argued that hospitals’ hesitation to establish gainsharing
188
programs is due to a lack of government funding in general. The
argument may be that hospitals do not have enough incentive to
incur the costs to start up such programs because they are not
189
guaranteed a benefit. This argument, however, disregards the fact
that the nature of gainsharing makes the largest costs, the payment to
the doctors, contingent upon savings to the hospital. Removing legal
barriers will reduce the risks associated with establishing a
gainsharing program and will make hospitals more willing to invest
financial resources.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Advisory

opinions

have

been

insufficient

in

promoting

HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 176 (Thomson Reuters 2011); see
also Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, available at,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande
(arguing that employing trial and error via pilot programs is an important way to
“curb costs and increase quality”).
184
MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note
172.
185
Id.
186
See id.
187
See discussion supra Part V for recommended statutory changes; see also Peter
D. Jacobson et al., Regulating the U.S. Health Care System: Failure in Motion, 36 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 583, 585–86 (2011) (noting generally that OIG’s approach to the
legality of gainsharing arrangements creates uncertainty, which “limits the expansion
of existing economic relationships because it is difficult to predict which
arrangements will satisfy regulators”); Edward Correia, Aligning Physician DecisionMaking with the Goals of Health Care Organizations: Are There Any Lessons from Law
Firms?, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 224, 246–48 (2012) (“[Health care
organizations] should not have to live with the uncertainty of the statute and the
burden of having to seek an advisory opinion in every case.”).
188
Gainsharing Gets Boost; Projects Still Lack Funding, MODERN PHYSICIAN, June 9,
2008, available at http://www.modernphysician.com/article/
20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579.
189
See id.
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gainsharing because entities may be penalized if the law changes in a
way that subsequently renders an advisory opinion void. Also, if
entities establish gainsharing programs and then the law changes,
conforming to changes in the law could be costly and could eliminate
any savings recognized by instituting the program. Hospitals and
physicians must have a sense of security that the law will not change
in this manner or that, if the law changes, Congress and regulatory
agencies will exempt programs that have already been established.
A. Tax-exempt Organizations
The Treasury Department should provide a safe harbor to the
190
requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
An
argument against this action is that it could invite fraud. Hospitals
might create purported gainsharing programs that do not institute
any cost-saving or quality-improving measures, but simply serve to
190

See generally IRS Notice 2011-20, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf.
There are also concerns that tax-exempt ACOs will violate this regulation by
participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. See IRS Notice Regarding
Participation in the MSSP through an ACO, 2011 WL 1219269 (Apr. 18, 2011). The IRS
issued a notice soliciting comments on whether it has provided sufficient guidance as
to how ACOs can avoid violating restrictions on private inurement. See id. The
notice states that:
[T]he IRS expects that it will not consider a tax-exempt organization’s
participation in the MSSP through an ACO to result in inurement or
impermissible private benefit to the private party ACO participants
where:
· The terms of the tax-exempt organization’s participation in the MSSP
through the ACO (including its share of MSSP payments or losses and
expenses) are set forth in advance in a written agreement negotiated at
arm’s length.
· CMS has accepted the ACO into, and has not terminated the ACO
from, the MSSP.
· The tax-exempt organization’s share of economic benefits derived
from the ACO (including its share of MSSP payments) is proportional
to the benefits or contributions the tax-exempt organization provides
to the ACO. If the tax-exempt organization receives an ownership
interest in the ACO, the ownership interest received is proportional
and equal in value to its capital contributions to the ACO and all ACO
returns of capital, allocations and distributions are made in proportion
to ownership interests.
· The tax-exempt organization’s share of the ACO’s losses (including
its share of MSSP losses) does not exceed the share of ACO economic
benefits to which the tax-exempt organization is entitled.
· All contracts and transactions entered into by the tax-exempt
organization with the ACO and the ACO’s participants, and by the
ACO with the ACO’s participants and any other parties, are at fair
market value.
Id.
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distribute profits illegally. Although fraud is a concern, the safe
harbor provision could contain many of the same requirements
contained within the proposed Stark Law exception and the
191
demonstration programs.
For example, the Treasury Department
could require hospitals to maintain documentation of the measures
implemented, the baseline measures of performance, and ongoing
measurements of quality of care and cost savings. Upon an audit, the
hospital would be required to produce this documentation. Adding
such a requirement to the safe harbor would not add any additional
costs to the hospitals because they would already be required to take
these steps in order to qualify for other safe harbor provisions.
B. Anti-Kickback Statute
The AKS should be amended to include a safe harbor for
gainsharing programs. As discussed above in the context of treasury
regulations, the safe harbor could include several requirements to
192
ensure that only bona fide programs qualify for the safe harbor.
Additionally, these requirements would not burden hospitals with any
193
costs that they would not otherwise have to bear. As with providing
a safe harbor under Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2),
providing a safe harbor for gainsharing programs under the AKS
could invite fraud. The safe harbor provision could contain
requirements like those in the proposed Stark Law exception and the
194
demonstration programs to deter fraud.
C. Stark Law
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid proposed an exception
to the Stark Law in 2008. The exception would have applied to
payments made to physicians participating in:
certain documented incentive payments or shared savings
programs designed to achieve (1) improvement of the
quality of hospital patient care services by changing
physician clinical or administrative practices, and/or (2)
actual costs savings for the hospital resulting from the
reduction of waste or changes in a physician’s clinical or
administrative practices, without an adverse effect on or
191

See supra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying test for requirements of
gainsharing programs in demonstration programs; see infra notes 195–201 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed Stark exception.
192
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
193
See supra Part V.A.
194
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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diminution in the quality of hospital patient care services.
This exception would only apply to incentive programs that met
196
certain criteria. Programs would be required to identify cost-saving
or quality-improvement measures and to track the success of these
197
Hospitals would then set goals for performance
measures.
198
measures and identify baseline levels.
Under the proposed
exception, programs would be required to include at least five
physicians and to give all physicians within the applicable specialty
the opportunity to participate without regard to the physician’s
199
patient volume or level of “business generated for the hospital.”
The hospital would be prohibited from limiting the products
available to doctors or preventing them from adopting new
200
technologies that are “linked to improved outcomes.”
The
exception also required the hospital to disclose to patients that it had
established a gainsharing program and would have required hospitals
201
to maintain records of the cost-saving measures.
CMS did not adopt the proposed exception of a number of
concerns, in particular that it was too restrictive to permit
202
innovation.
In an advocacy letter to CMS, the American Hospital
Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, and the
Federation of American Hospitals stated that “[b]y regulating not
only the ‘what’ but the ‘how’ of an incentive payment or sharedsavings program, CMS limits hospitals’ ability to incorporate the
health care community’s evolving understanding of what contributes
203
to patient quality and safety.”
Also, the exception only applied to
programs that did not violate other federal statutes—notably,
gainsharing programs are also likely to violate the AKS and CMP
204
statute.
195

Hayman, supra note 35.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Hayman, supra note 195.
202
Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at 488.
203
Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President of the Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Joanne
Conroy, Chief Health Care Officer of the Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges & Charles N.
Kahn III, President of the Fed’n of Am. Hosps., to Charlene Frizzera, Acting Adm’r
of the Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Feb. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2009/090217-cl-CMS-1403-FC.pdf.
204
See Part I.B and III.D supra for discussion of the legal barriers posed by the
AKS and CMP laws.
196
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The proposed exception takes into account a number of the
concerns that have been expressed about gainsharing and therefore
should be used as a model in enacting a new exception. Specifically,
the requirement that hospitals set goals and identify baseline
measures and track performance will help ensure that physicians feel
they are compensated fairly, thus increasing “buy-in” and motivation
205
to participate.
Prohibitions against limiting the products available
and the use of new technologies protect the physicians from being
excessively controlled and allow them to exercise clinical judgment.
They also simultaneously protect individual patients from being
denied specialized care. The requirement that hospitals disclose the
establishment of the gainsharing program to patients maintains
transparency and will help prevent patients from thinking they are
206
being shortchanged.
According to the OIG’s 2005 opinions,
hospitals must disclose the gainsharing program to patients in
writing, preferably before patients are admitted, but otherwise prior
207
to surgery.
The proposed exception, however, demands that hospitals
208
identify the cost-saving or quality improvement measures up front.
As Saver noted, part of the gainsharing process is to solicit
209
suggestions for cost-saving measures.
By requiring hospitals to
identify the cost-saving measures up-front, the law may indirectly
require them to solicit suggestions from physicians before there is any
guarantee that the suggestions can legally be implemented.
Although this may not seem prohibitive, it would involve using
physicians’ time to discuss the suggestions and the likelihood of
success of cost-saving measures. Depending on the type of measures
suggested, involvement of administrative personnel and other staff
205

See Part II.C supra, stating that gainsharing programs in general may be more
likely than other cost-saving measures to encourage physician “buy-in.”
206
According to one longitudinal study, there was no statistically significant
difference between overall patient satisfaction before and after the institution of a
gainsharing program. Charles Foster & Lynn Godkin, “Gainsharing” and Patient
Satisfaction, HEALTH PROGRESS, July/Aug. 2000, at 47–48,
available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&ved=
0CEAQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chausa.org%2Fworkarea%2FDownloadAsse
t.aspx%3Fid%3D2147483964&ei=dZe1Tt3LEKjg2AXLxNDMDQ&usg=AFQjCNHd30yr_wuVAQSV7-IQ1jW8PF_eg&sig2=W4mdptcp5rpEmMjrX6TpRA. The article,
however, states that all non-management employees were included in the program
and does not describe the nature of the cost-saving measures taken. Id. at 43.
207
Barry F. Rosen & Jacy D’Aiutolo, Commentary: Doctors May Share in Hospitals’
Cost Cuts, Sometimes, DAILY RECORD, Sept. 9, 2005.
208
Hayman, supra note 35.
209
Saver, supra note 3, at 170–71.
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members may be required to assess the feasibility of the suggestions.
This amounts to an investment on the part of the hospital without
any guarantee that the measures could legally be implemented. To
avoid this problem, the exception could include a grace period
during which the hospital and physicians, having already committed
to a gainsharing arrangement, could identify cost-saving measures
and establish the necessary benchmarks.
Saver and others have proposed an alternative interpretation for
the restriction against paying doctors to “limit or reduce services” for
210
Medicare and Medicaid patients.
The OIG has interpreted these
statutes to apply to any services, whether or not the services are
211
medically necessary.
Medicare’s reimbursement rules, however,
state that Medicare will only reimburse for services that are
212
Therefore, one could argue that the
“reasonable and necessary.”
words “medically necessary” are inherently implied in the Stark Law
213
and CMP Statute.
A reversal of opinion by the OIG, however,
might not provide hospitals with the sense of security needed to
incentivize them to institute gainsharing programs. There could be
an ongoing concern that the OIG will revisit the decision and return
to its former interpretation.
D. CMP Statute
As discussed above, under the CMP Statute, the OIG may seek
civil monetary penalties from hospitals that pay physicians to reduce
or limit services for Medicare and Medicaid patients and on
214
physicians who accept such payments.
The OIG has interpreted
this statute to include all services, even those that are not medically
215
necessary.
Saver suggested that the OIG’s interpretation of the
statute was incorrect, and that the statute, by its nature, would only
apply to situations in which a physician limited or reduced services

210

Id. at 165 n.71.
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87.
212
Saver, supra note 3, at 165 n.71. The term “reasonable and necessary” has not
been defined by statute; its meaning has been debated. Timothy P. Blanchard,
Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH
L. 599, 604 (2004). Blanchard suggests that the term “reasonable” and “necessary”
may take cost into account as well as the patient’s health: “What ‘necessary’ services
are ‘reasonable’ for taxpayers or members of an insurance risk pool to shoulder?” Id.
213
Id.
214
42 U.S.C § 1320a-7a (2006).
215
Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87.
211
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216

that were medically necessary.
Although this is a compelling
argument, a change in the OIG’s interpretation may not be sufficient
because, without an actual change to the statute, the OIG may reverse
its decision. In order to encourage hospitals to establish gainsharing
programs, more certainty is needed.
Claiborne has proposed that the CMP Statute’s application to
gainsharing programs could be resolved by amending the statute to
include the words “medically necessary” so that the statute prohibits
217
paying doctors to reduce or limit medically necessary services. It is
likely that this would resolve the problem, especially considering the
importance that the OIG has placed upon the words “medically
218
necessary” in previous decisions.
E. The Hospital Fair Competition Act of 2005
In 2005, Senator Charles Grassley and twenty-three co-sponsors
introduced a bill in the Senate that would have explicitly made
219
gainsharing programs legal.
S.1002, titled the Hospital Fair
Competition Act of 2005, would have created exemptions to the CMP
Statute, the federal AKS, and the Stark Law for “arrangements
between hospitals or critical access hospitals and physicians in which
physicians share in the savings experienced by the hospital or critical
access hospital by reason of cost-reduction efforts that involve the
220
physicians.”
The bill also authorized the Secretary of Department
of HHS to establish requirements for the programs to ensure that the
shared-savings arrangements did not pose a risk to patient care and
that “financial incentives that could affect physician referrals [would
221
222
be] minimized.” The bill expired at the end of the session. The
record as to the bill is very limited, but it is possible that the Hospital
Fair Competition Act did not progress in the Senate due to concerns
about a provision that would have extended the Stark Law’s
prohibition on physician-owned hospitals and changes to the way that
223
hospitals would be paid.
216

Saver, supra note 3, at 164–65.
Claiborne et al., supra note 7 at 491.
218
Id.
219
Hospital Fair Competition Act, S. 1002, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005); see Appendix
A for § 4 of the Hospital Fair Competition Act of 2005.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See, e.g., Proposed Self-Referral Ban Casts Chill on Specialty Hospitals, MCDERMOTT
WILL
&
EMERY
(May
18,
2005),
217
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Outlier Laws

Saver suggested minimal regulation via outlier laws, which would
“identify only the most problematic practices, leaving other forms of
224
gainsharing unregulated.” Other problematic forms of gainsharing
that were troublesome but not the most problematic would be
discouraged by “publicity, market pressures, physicians’ professional
225
ethics, and tort deterrence,” rather than regulation.
Such a law
may encourage hospitals to adopt gainsharing programs and
experiment with cost-saving measures. Enacting such a law, however,
would still leave hospitals with a great deal of uncertainty as to
whether they risk violating the CMP, the AKS, or the Stark law, and
whether they risk losing their tax-exempt status. The outlier laws
could provide an exemption for gainsharing programs. In order to
prevent fraud, the law would then have to define what qualifies as a
gainsharing program. This could mean restricting the freedom of
hospitals, which is what adopting the outlier laws would strive to
avoid. An outlier law would be a promising possibility if it included
minimal standards for what programs would qualify for exemptions
of the problematic laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
If given the appropriate regulatory environment, gainsharing
programs have the potential to reduce healthcare costs and increase
efficiency without sacrificing the quality of healthcare. A number of
legal barriers have prevented such programs from taking hold
because hospitals and other medical entities do not want to risk
facing penalties. Efforts to encourage, or at least accommodate,
gainsharing programs have thus far been accomplished in a
piecemeal manner, through pilot programs and advisory opinions.
Although Congress enacted a large number of changes to
healthcare via PPACA, it did not resolve the legal barriers to
gainsharing in this legislation in a permanent way. Although the OIG
may continue to issue favorable advisory opinions, healthcare
organizations will only be able to establish productive and permanent
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/
e6710c2c-4070-4d10-b5f4-cea8c7a74d0d.cfm; Congress Holds Gainsharing Hearing,
GREATER N.Y. HOSP. ASS’N, http://www.gnyha.org/902/Default.aspx?&print=yes
(opposing changes to hospital payment methods but supporting the ban on
physician-owned hospitals).
224
Saver, supra note 3, at 227–28.
225
Id. at 228.
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gainsharing programs if Congress makes permanent amendments to
the relevant statutes.
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APPENDIX A
THE HOSPITAL FAIR COMPETITION ACT OF 2005
SEC. 4. PERMISSIBLE COORDINATED CARE INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS
(a) Establishment of Requirements for Arrangements and Exemption
From Imposition of Civil Monetary Penalties- Section 1128A of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
o. Arrangements Between Hospitals and Physicians(1) IN GENERAL - Subsection (b) shall not apply to an
arrangement that meet the requirements under
paragraph (2).
(2) REQUIREMENTS (A) ESTABLISHMENT- The Secretary shall establish
requirements for arrangements between hospitals or
critical access hospitals and physicians in which
physicians share in the savings experienced by the
hospital or critical access hospital by reason of costreduction efforts that involve the physicians.

(B) PROTECTIONS- In establishing the requirements
under subparagraph
(A), the Secretary shall ensure that—
(i) the quality of care provided to individuals is
protected under the arrangement; and
(ii)financial incentives that could affect physician
referrals are minimized.
(C) MONITOR- The Secretary shall establish
procedures to monitor arrangements described in
subparagraph (A) to ensure that such agreements meet
the requirements under such subparagraph.
(b)Exemption From Criminal Penalties- Section 1128B(b)(3) of
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the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3)) is amended(1) in subparagraph (G), by striking ‘and’ at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (H), as added by section 237(d) of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2213)-(A)
by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B)
by striking the period at the end and inserting a
semicolon;
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (H), as added by section
431(a) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2287), as
subparagraph (I);
(4) in subparagraph (I), as so redesignated—
(A) by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘; and’;
and
(5) by adding at the end of the following new subparagraph:
(J) an arrangement that meets the requirements established
under section 1128A(o).
(b) Exemption From Limitation on Certain Physician ReferralsSection 1877(e) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e))
is amended by adding at the end of the following new
paragraph:
(9)
ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN
HOSPITALS
AND
PHYSICIANS- An arrangement that meets the requirements
established under section 1128A(o).

